Search results for "Stackelberg competition"
showing 10 items of 26 documents
Data offloading and task allocation for cloudlet-assisted ad hoc mobile clouds
2016
Nowadays, although the data processing capabilities of the modern mobile devices are developed in a fast speed, the resources are still limited in terms of processing capacity and battery lifetime. Some applications, in particular the computationally intensive ones, such as multimedia and gaming, often require more computational resources than a mobile device can afford. One way to address such a problem is that the mobile device can offload those tasks to the centralized cloud with data centers, the nearby cloudlet or ad hoc mobile cloud. In this paper, we propose a data offloading and task allocation scheme for a cloudlet-assisted ad hoc mobile cloud in which the master device (MD) who ha…
Online Pricing via Stackelberg and Incentive Games in a Micro-Grid
2019
This paper deals with the analysis and design of online pricing mechanisms in micro-grids. Two cases are studied in which the market layer is modeled as an open-loop and closed-loop dynamical system respectively. In the case of open-loop market dynamics, the price is generated as equilibrium price of a Stackelberg game with an incentive strategy. In such Stackelberg game, the leader is the energy supplier, the follower is the consumer, and the leader plays an incentive strategy. In the case of closed-loop market dynamics, the price is obtained as a function of the power supplied and the demand. A stability analysis is provided for both cases, which sheds light on the transient and steady-st…
On coincidence of feedback and global Stackelberg equilibria in a class of differential games
2021
This paper shows for a class of differential games that the global Stackelberg equilibrium (GSE) coincides with the feedback Stackelberg equilibrium (FSE), although the GSE assumes that the leader/regulator an- nounces at the initial time the regulatory instrument rule she will follow for the rest of the game, while in the FSE, the regulator at any time chooses the optimal level of the regulatory instrument rate. This coincidence is based on the fact that the FSE is calculated using dynamic programming what implies that although the regulator chooses the regulatory instrument rate level that maximizes social welfare, the first-order condition for the maximization of the right-hand side of t…
On the Coincidence of the Feedback Nash and Stackelberg Equilibria in Economic Applications of Differential Games
2002
In this paper the scope of the applicability of the Stackelberg equilibrium concept in differential games is investigated. Firstly, conditions for obtaining the coincidence between the Stackelberg and Nash equilibria are defined in terms of the instantaneous pay-off function and the state equation of the game. Secondly, it is showed that for a class of differential games with state-interdependence both equilibria are identical independently of the player being the leader of the game. A survey of different economic models shows that this coincidence is going to occur for a good number of economic applications of differential games. This result appears because of the continuous-time setting i…
Stackelberg-Cournot and Cournot equilibria in a mixed markets exchange economy
2012
In this note, we compare two strategic general equilibrium concepts: the Stackelberg-Cournot equilibrium and the Cournot equilibrium. We thus consider a market exchange economy including atoms and a continuum of traders, who behave strategically. We show that, when the preferences of the small traders are represented by Cobb-Douglas utility functions and the atoms have the same utility functions and endowments, the Stackelberg-Cournot and the Cournot equilibrium equilibria coincide if and only if the followers’ best responses functions have a zero slope at the SCE.
The Stackelberg equilibrium as a consistent conjectural equilibrium
2011
International audience; We consider a static game with conjectural variations where some firms make conjectures while others do not. Two propositions are proved. We first show that there exists a continuum of conjectural variations such that the conjectural equilibrium locally coincides with the Stackelberg equilibrium (Proposition 1). Second, we define the conditions under which a conjectural equilibrium is a locally consistent equilibrium (i.e. such that conjectures are fulfilled). The conceptof (local) consistency is restricted to firms making conjectures. Two conditions on consistency are featured: consistency within a cohort and consistency among cohorts. The Stackelberg equilibrium fu…
Second-best taxation for a polluting monopoly with abatement investment
2018
This paper characterizes the optimal tax rule to regulate a polluting monopoly when the firm has the possibility of investing in an abatement technology and the environmental damages are caused by a stock pollutant. The optimal policy is given by the stagewise feedback Stackelberg equilibrium of a dynamic policy game between a regulator and a monopolist. The regulator playing as the leader chooses an emission tax to maximize net social welfare, and the monopolist acting as the follower selects the output and the investment in abatement technology to maximize profits. We find that the optimal tax has two components. The first component is negative and equal to the gap between the marginal re…
ENDOGENOUS TIMING WITH FREE ENTRY
2006
A free entry model with linear costs is considered where firms first choose their entry time and then compete in the market according to the resulting timing decisions. Multiple equilibria arise allowing for infinitely many industry output configurations encompassing one limit-output dominant firm and the Cournot equilibrium with free entry as extreme cases. Sequential entry is never observed. Both Stackelberg and Cournot-like outcomes are sustainable as equilibria however. When the number of incumbents is given, entry is always prevented, and industry output is sometimes larger than the entry preventing level.
A Stackelberg-game approach to support the design of logistic terminals
2014
This paper deals with the design of logistic terminals taking Sicily, in the South of Italy, as a case study. It focuses on consolidation terminals for truckers and addresses the problem of optimising location pattern and public share in investments. This problem is solved through a Stackelberg game between the designer and the collective of road carriers. So a bilevel approach combines a system-optimum problem, at the upper level, with the carrier equilibrium problem, at the lower level. The choice behaviour of the lower-level player is simulated by a random utility model. The output of the game suggests that private companies and society should share the investments and the public contrib…
Stackelberg-Walras and Cournot-Walras equilibria in mixed markets: a comparison
2012
In this note, we compare two strategic general equilibrium concepts: the Stackelberg-Walras equilibrium and the Cournot-Walras equilibrium. We thus consider a market exchange economy embodying atoms and a continuum of traders. It is shown that, when the preferences of the small traders are represented by Cobb-Douglas utility functions, the Stackel-berg-Walras and the Cournot-Walras equilibria can coincide only if 1) the endowments and preferences of atoms are identical and 2) the elasticity of the followers’ best response functions are equal to zero in equilibrium.